

Toward a Phenomenology of Theoria

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Ever since Pythagoras likened the “philosopher,” a name he coined, to the man who goes to the games not to gain riches or fame but merely to contemplate the beautiful things, the contrast between theoretical and practical manners of living has been a theme for philosophical reflection. With respect to the philosophy of Husserl—reflective philosopher par excellence—it must be recognized that, logically prior to being transcendental or mundane on the one hand and eidetic or empirical on the other hand, phenomenological investigation is theoretical.

Inasmuch as phenomenological philosophy must account for itself as well as for everything else, an inquiry into what it means to be theoretical is necessary to it.

In the present investigation I attempt to describe some of the more obvious features of theoretical and practical life with respect to how the theme is constituted in them. Aron Gurwitsch has concerned himself with thematic consciousness of the perceptual and conceptual sorts, demonstrating the role of the theme in the structure of the field of consciousness and of thematizing operations in the consciousness of that field. In emphasizing the contrast between the theoretical and the practical and in emphasizing the “praxic” and “pathic” as well as the “doxic” positionalities in both sorts of life, I approach the problem of thematization in a different but, I believe, ultimately complementary fashion.

The Approach Taken in this Investigation

While it is possible to inspect important phenomena of practical life as they occur in others, an other is notoriously “absent-minded” when he is theorizing. Thus, to describe the phenomena of theoria, one must turn to one’s own life-stream as one

finds it going on, that is, one must reflect; and indeed one must reflect theoretically. What “theoretically” means should of course come out as the present investigation progresses. While he may have overlooked or explained away the phenomena of *theoria*, the probable reader of the present essay is, I contend, nevertheless more than likely to be quite familiar with the mode of life said to be theoretical, and I shall therefore rely upon his familiarity as I attempt to explicate some of these phenomena. As for what it means to reflect, something can and must be said here at the outset if my approach is to be generally comprehensible.

The reflective attitude is the alternative to the straightforward attitude. When one is busied with something without thematizing its indicativeness to one’s self or one’s stream of living, not to speak of thematizing that living or that self themselves, one is in a straightforward attitude. We usually live in the straightforward attitude, although consequently we do not come “to think of it” in that attitude. In that attitude the things are simply “*there!*” When one reflects, however, one comes to recognize that the same things which had been there *simpliciter* in the straightforward attitude are “intentional objects,” or, to use a mode of expression I have from Dorion Cairns, they are “things intended to.” And, more specifically, one recognizes that the things which are taken as there *simpliciter* in the straightforward attitude are, in the reflective attitude, things intended to as “outwardly transcendent” to one’s stream of conscious living. Besides being able to reflect on outwardly transcendent things, one may reflect upon things “immanent” in one’s stream of life, namely, mental processes as they go on or flow by; and in thus reflecting immanently, one would notice first of all those life-processes in which outward transcendencies are intended to. Some of the immanent things may be reflectively seen, moreover, to be immanently intensitive to other processes in the same lifestream, e.g., protentive to processes in the future of the intensitive process reflected upon and retrotentive to processes in the past of that

process, and, much more obviously, there are the reflective processes in which other processes in one's stream are *reflectively* intended to, grasped, explicated, and described. Finally, there may be processes which are reflectively found to be intensive to one's self as the self who engages in them and busies himself with his themes through them.

To describe the approach employed here as generally one of theoretical reflecting on life is hardly adequate for even the simplest of introductory purposes. All of phenomenology is theoretically reflective, and there are various specific disciplines within phenomenology. A brief review of various specific attitudes within the attitude of theoretical reflection will prepare us for selecting the specific approach appropriate for the task of the present investigation. The transcendental attitude of theoretical reflection is an attitude which can be adopted by "reduction" of the "natural attitude." In the natural attitude, one accepts the worldliness of one's self and life implicitly, while in the transcendental phenomenological attitude one explicitly refrains from accepting that worldliness and thereby uncovers the fundamental, preworldly, or transcendental ontic status which they have. One can reflect theoretically in the natural attitude as well as in the transcendental attitude. Abiding by the natural attitude, one can perform a "psychological phenomenological epochē" and thereby refrain from accepting the "real relations" of one's self and one's processes of living as worldly (and hence as "psychic") with somatic and environmental objects and processes; in that way, one can adopt the reduced psychological attitude of natural theoretical reflection and investigate psychologically pure phenomena. If one does not perform the psychological epochē, one can still reflect theoretically upon one's life as a psychophysical life "really" situated in the physical, social, and cultural world. Such an attitude might be called an "anthropological phenomenological attitude."

The task of an investigation determines the approach. In the present case, the

task is to compare theoretical and practical life as they are thematic. Now practical life is necessarily psycho-physical. It cannot go on without including acceptance of the real relations between the soma and environment, on the one hand, and the psychic life, on the other. Moreover, while theoretical life in general is not necessarily psychophysical, it can be, and indeed ordinarily is; for most theorizers do not even adopt a reflective attitude in the full sense, much less perform a psychological epochē, not to speak of transcendental reduction and purification. (It occurs to me that the sharp differentiation between psychic and somatic phenomena essential to the more sophisticated phenomenological approaches may well have obscured the elementary difference between the theoretical and the practical which any phenomenologist uses but few have seen as a problem.) At all events, what I call upon the reader to attempt to do here in order to verify my account is to reflect *theoretically* upon his own *psychophysical* life. While such anthropological phenomenology is appropriate here, it is by no means the ultimate phenomenological approach.

Most of living in general goes on “automatically,” i.e., without a self having engaged or even being able to engage in it. Most of the rest of living goes on “habitually,” i.e., by itself without the self’s engaging in it, although it could. A small portion of one’s life does have one’s self actively or passively engaged in it and busied with themes through it. In the present investigation I shall be concerned only with the last-characterized sort of life, which can be called “actional.” This is appropriate because theoretical living is predominantly if not exclusively actional and because the more obvious processes and objects in practical life pertain to that stratum. In actional living the thing which is centrally intended to and which plays the central role in the organization of the field of things intended to, as Aron Gurwitsch has shown, stands out from the rest of the field and is called the “theme.” Typically, the practical theme as well as the matter thematically theorized

about are outwardly transcendent to one's life-stream. In the present connection I shall confine myself to such typical situations.

The Theme in Practical Life

We are all familiar with various sorts of the kind of life which is ordinarily called practical. Alfred Schutz has compared daily life with dream, fancy, and scientific contemplation,¹ but he has hardly touched upon the theme and thematic intentiveness in his investigations. It seems to me to be more in accord with current usage to speak of "practical life" rather than of "daily life." While I shall use "practical" to name what I shall contrast to theoretical life, I shall use the neologism "praxic," stemming from the same root, in a narrower sense to characterize the *using* dimension of concrete living in general and hence of both the practical and theoretical species of life. In the same way I shall use Husserl's word "doxic" for the *believing* dimension and coin the word "pathic" from *pathos* to characterize the *valuing* dimension of both kinds of life. It has not always been accepted that theoretical life as well as practical life has its affective-emotional (= pathic) and effective volitional (= praxic) dimensions. "Life" is used here to express the concept, not only of the concretely opinional, emotional, and volitional process of living, but also of any transcendent object and subject of living outwardly or inwardly intended to in it.

Practical living in general, as a species of natural living, is implicitly acceptive of itself—and of any self that engages in it and all other things outwardly transcendent to it—as directly or indirectly located in the one spatial, temporal, and causal world. As a human being, one is a human among other humans and hence is

¹ *Collected Papers*, 3 vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, 1964, 1966), *passim*; cf., especially, "On Multiple Realities" in Volume 1. Cf. Aron Gurwitsch, *The Field of Consciousness* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964), Part VI.

in society with a few familiar and many strange others, as well as in history with still more predecessors, contemporaries, and successors. On the basis of what one has learned from others, in the main, but also, to at least some extent, from what one has learned on one's own, all the contents of the naturally accepted world have cultural sense in terms of what they are and how they are habitually believed, valued, and used. The properties I have mentioned are essential to natural life as such. What, then, differentiates *practical* natural living?

Alfred Schutz called the spontaneity of everyday life “working,” and I take that word over to express a somewhat broader concept. Schutz emphasizes what might be called deliberate action, describing it as actively projected and elected before it goes on and as actively recollected and interpreted after it has elapsed. The broader concept of action that I shall employ here does not require that the action be actionally expected or recollected, although it does not exclude those events either. There is theoretical as well as practical action in both Schutz's narrower and my broader sense of the word. Schutz stresses that practical action or “working” involves somatic movement, socially involved, and brings about a change in one's environment. In these respects I concur with his account and may be said to refine and extend it.

The theme in straightforward practical life, that with which one is busied in that life, is a *real change* in some thing or things in one's outwardly transcendent environment. By “real” is meant. that the thing is in time. Again adapting words from Schutz, this thematized change may be spoken of as a “problem at hand” when it is thematically intended to *before* being pursued and a “purpose at hand” while it is being worked on; and, once a particular stint of working has elapsed, it may be called a “product.” “Change” is here understood in the broad sense that includes having a thing stay the same with respect to its real determinations (properties and relations) when it might become different, as well as having it

cease to be, not come to be, or, in the more usual sense of the word “change,” become different. Throughout the change which the work theme undergoes, it is itself identical; it is the object of an identifying synthesis wherein, whether it is intended to as coming to be or not, as staying the same or not, as ceasing to be or not, it is intended to as the same thing. While the practical theme is intended to as identical throughout a working phase of practical life, much can also be said about *how* it is intended to, *Le.*, about how it is intuited and about how it is posited.

The predominant form of intuition in practical life is perceptual intuiting, and in it, as in all forms of intuition, there is a continuum of degrees, ranging from empty to full, in which, as Husserl has shown, that which is intended to can be presented. Where working is preservative rather than preventive, creative, or destructive, it includes a perceptual anticipating that the same theme will, at the anticipated termination of working, have an appearance quite similar to but not identical with the perceptual appearance it presents now; in the other anticipations, the theme would appear dissimilarly. What is remarkable here is that it is the *future* and *not the present* appearance of the practical theme which is, in actual working, intended to perceptually. Yet that future appearance of the practically thematized thing pointingly refers to the present appearance it is to replace. If one recollects a product, especially just after leaving off working to produce it, that product has a freshness about it which can be reflectively recognized to be a pointing reference to how the same thing was formerly perceivable.

The form of intuition prevailing in practical life is perception. While perceiving is thus the basis upon which one would ultimately be sure of one's practical theme, still one is not usually *clear* about that theme in working. It does happen that we pause and look over the results of our endeavors, and it does happen that we “imagine” or fictively perceive how things might be different; but by far the greater part of our working life goes on without such perceptual or quasi-

perceptual action. Nevertheless, the things upon which one works are there. In practical living, what we believe the thing to be is much more important than what we perceive it to be; and perhaps more important than what we believe it to be is how we accept a thing as valuable and usable. Perhaps an example will help to show what I mean. My automobile is certainly believed in by me whether or not it is perceived; it exists with simple certainty; I'm sure it does. As something believed in, it is also something *valued* in various ways, e.g., esthetically and intrinsically for its shape, color, furnishings, etc., and morally and instrumentally for its safety, maneuverability, economy, reliability, etc. As a handsome and dependable vehicle, it may be *used* by me as a means to the end of impressing my neighbor or to the end of getting somewhere, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, money and labor can be used by me as means to the ends of its maintenance and improvement.

In this example I have mentioned *positive* doxic, pathic, and praxic qualities of what is straightforwardly accepted as my existent, good, and useful car. But there are negative and neutral modes of such positional qualities. If I have heard from a reliable source that my house has burned down and I believe that my desk was in my house and is flammable, I tend strongly to doubt that my desk can still be the functional writing place I have lived with before; I would say that it is inexistent, and, when I get home, I will be able to confirm or disconfirm perceptually what I now firmly doubt. But simply doubting that my old desk is still there motivates a disliking of the way it now *is*, i.e., its inexistence; and it is also on that basis then accepted as praxically useless. The positional qualities of the work theme are not typically thematized in their own right. One ordinarily believes, likes, and uses things without paying particular attention to their qualities as believed, valued, and used. But in order to understand the work theme and the working action intentive to it, these qualities must be explicated and described.

When a practical theme arises as a problem, when it is problematically thematic, it emerges from a background of what is habitually and unquestioningly believed to be simply certain. Some of the belief in that background is constantly if implicitly confirmed by automatic and habitual perceptual processes. Practical problems are, I believe, perceived, but this is more a matter of perceptual failure than success. When a problem arises, what has been believed is noticeably not coincident with what is perceived; one then ‘looks to see what is wrong,’ and, having looked into things, one doxically accepts the purpose in working which will straighten things out. The theme is modalized from problematical to possible (in the sense of practicable). Simply by virtue of not appearing as believably anticipated, the theme which is posed as problematical is valued negatively, although upon inspection it may prove to have turned out better rather than worse although still different than believably anticipated.

Where the change purposed in the straightforward attitude typical of practical action is concerned, the purpose at hand is always believed *possible* under the circumstances believed to prevail when the problem at hand is posed and then transformed or modalized into a purpose. If change is not believed possible, if the thing is not believed able to be otherwise than it is believed to be, then the problematical theme does not become a purpose. As a rule the theme itself then ceases even to be problematical and returns to the mode of simple certainty in which all things out on the practical margin stand. At all events, when working itself begins, the alterability of the purpose at hand has already been accepted as possible and continues to be accepted doxically in that mode as long as working proceeds as it is believably anticipated that it will. When a course or phase of working has occurred, part or all of the change which it was to produce is believed to be actual—a belief which is seldom confirmed by actional perceiving. As a rule, one simply moves ahead without looking back; and what is believed to have been

produced in earlier working contributes to the circumstances under which other purposes are taken in hand.

The pathic or valuing dimension of working life is predominantly one of comparative valuation. Comparative valuing is tentative, in the first place, to what is believed possible over against what is believed actual and, in the second place, to the different actualizable alternatives to the present thing, including its coming to be and passing away. When things are comparatively valued, they are valued in terms of which is better and which worse. Moreover, it must be emphasized that things are valued both instrumentally and intrinsically. For example, when it has just snowed, the yard in front of my house may have considerable positive esthetic value. I may say that it is beautiful; but when I consider that guests are coming, the hindrance that the snow on the walk will cause them makes it a problem for me. My theme is that snow-covered walk. To clear it of snow would require work. To leave it snow-covered would inconvenience my friends. I value their ease in entering my home over the stiff back which working would cause, so my purpose at hand becomes that of producing a shoveled walk.

The most obvious feature of working is not the perceiving, valuing, believing, or even the using which are involved in it. The most outstanding characteristic of working is somatic movement. Whether locomotive, manipulative, or operative, working processes are bodily. In this connection, one's state as a human being is always a circumstance in practical life. Insofar as practical life is straightforward, somatic matters are marginal. Still, as the possibility of a stiff back in the just-offered example indicates, they can become quite significant. What is crucial in working is that one always uses an organ of one's organism as means to the end of solving practical problems, in producing a product where a problem was perceived. Just as in highly mechanized scientific research the role of perceiving remains essential, even when it is reduced to the reading of meters, so in highly

mechanized practical life the essential role of somatic moving may be reduced to the pressing of buttons. Yet moving is an essential constituent of working, which is the form of action in practical life.

Working itself and the theme variously intended to in it are typically accepted in practical life as public and not private things. When some working has taken place, it is believed that a perceivable product has appeared, whether or not the one who is working or anyone else happens to be perceiving it. Even the typical problem is a common problem, “our problem”; and, when it is “my problem,” it could just as easily have been or become “your problem,” “his problem,” or “their problem.” Similarly for the value and use statuses of a work theme. Most products are perceived apart from the working actions in which they are constituted. In the straightforward attitude we do not explicitly recognize products as products, but, if asked, we acknowledge, after a little reflection, that someone, typically unknown, produced the thing in question. It has happened that everything was accepted as the product of Someone, i.e., a god; but that presupposes that things were accepted as products which were not products. I have watched a man make a tree into lumber, but I have not seen someone make a tree. The original for the derivative assurance that the thing encountered is a product worked out by somebody is the perceiving of a change being effected in working, either as it goes on in one’s own life or in the life of an other.

The possibility of accepting the movements of the other as processes of working in which real changes are made upon a theme is founded upon the acceptance of the other as a psychophysical human like oneself. In practical life it is literally unquestionable that the others are there. *What* an other believes in, *what* he values, *what* he will use for end and for means, may be obscure, but *that* he is living a life with the same sort of intuitional and positional dimensions as mine is not. In short, others are automatically encountered or believed encounterable by

man in practical life. Moreover, not only are others certainly there, but one also accepts oneself as certainly encounterable. It is also obvious that one can and does love, hate, like, dislike others or can be apathetic about them and that one is related to in the same emotional-valuational ways by others in practical life, particularly in actions of working. And one *uses* others as means to one's own ends and is in turn *used* as means to their ends in the practical situation.

To be socially involved, which is essential to any sort of practical life, is to be actively or passively working with others. One encounters others as circumstances and even as problems and is oneself encountered as a circumstance and even as a problem by others. Most vividly, participants in a practical situation have a theme in common and are working together on it, working with one another, working for one another, or working against one another. And the theme in such social working can as well be a human as a nonhuman thing, for we do work on people. Indeed, it may well be that the original of all work themes is the other human being.

The Theme in Theoria

By "THEORIA" I mean collectively the theoretical attitude, the theoretical manner of living, and the field of things intended to in that attitude and mode of living; "theoretical life" expresses the same concept. Theoria ordinarily occurs in a specific form pertaining to one or another special scientific or scholarly discipline. It may be that genuine philosophy involves an unrestricted theoretical attitude and field. Be that as it may, we can still attempt to grasp the general nature of theoria. Except that today its sense is too often extended to include technology, i.e., practical life consciously including theoretical results, the name "science" would be preferable to "theoria." The manner in which theoria involves doxa has long been investigated in philosophy, but it must be recognized that it also involves

specific pathic and praxic dimensions.

The concrete action (as defined early in the preceding section), which occurs in the theoretical attitude may be called “theorizing.” While it is usually actively actional, it can, I believe, be passively actional as well, as when the solution to a theoretical problem imposes itself upon the theorizer. The theme in theoria, as the Hellenes already recognized, is something which is not real; it is rather something which is atemporal, or, in Husserlian language, it is an “ideality.” Theoretical idealities are also not intrinsically localized, and they do not in and of themselves cause events. A theory is an ideality, something transcendent to the stream of living in which it is intended to, by virtue of its identity as opposed to the multiplicity of correlative life-processes. Not being something “real,” a theory is neither an “outward” nor an “inward” transcendency; rather it has the sort of transcendency common to all idealities. By virtue of its ideality, the theoretical theme does not have a future, present, or past, nor does it undergo real change; it does not appear in different ways while staying the same in the real way in which a real thing does, e.g., it does not grow, shrink, heat up, cool off, move about, etc.

The ideality which is the theme in theoria can, however, appear or not appear in its own peculiar way to a given theorizer; either on his own or aided by others, a theorizer can conceive a theory, abandon it, and even, in a special way, change it. Theories are made up of concepts and judgments or propositions. Besides being conceived and abandoned, different relations can be instituted among such things. Both the relations and their terms are generated by the theorizer. “Theoretical change” is brought about straightforwardly; it results from rearranging, removing, or adding to a complex of concepts or judgments, i.e., a theory. Once there is something to begin with, one may continue to build up a theory, the rules for such construction being one subject matter of logic. The producing, assembling, abandoning, rearranging, etc., of concepts, propositions,

and theories can be spoken of in general as the *theorizing of theories*.

The need for straightforward, theoretically productive, destructive, or reorganizational activity is “seen” only in a reflective theoretical attitude which is prior to the secondary theoretical reflecting by which *theoria* is investigated. And it is in the same sort of primary theoretical reflectiveness that the success or failure of the theory theorized is ascertained. It is due to this reflectiveness that “reflection” is sometimes a synonym for “theorizing.” What happens is that the theory is seen to be a thing-intended to, as the theory that one is considering, and as such is seen to bear pointing references to that which it is about. The things-about-which one theorizes, the *matters*, as I prefer to call them, may themselves be real or ideal, natural or transcendental, psychic, physical, or psychophysical, for in principle at least one may theorize about anything, including a theory. *While one theorizes theories, one theorizes about matters*. In the same way, one conceives concepts and conceives *of* matters, proposes propositions or judges judgments, and proposes or judges *about* matters.

The most important feature of the theory is its “being about” some matter or matters or other. In a concrete proposition, this is most notable in the material concepts, although the formal moments of the proposition, the sort of thing which the formal logician is concerned with, are also *about* something in the matters themselves. The matter theorized about, if it is real, may or may not be apparent along with, or *in*, the theory. If it is not, then steps can be taken to make it evident there-when, of course, there is a will to know. If the matter is something ideal, it can readily be made to appear in the theory in which it is pointedly referred to by the theory theorized. In that case, there is a tendency to identify the theory with the ideal matter, a tendency which is difficult to resist.

What sort of an ideality is a theory? An ideality in general is something that can be intended to in various ways, even intuitively; but it is not something which

is intrinsically in space, time, or causal connections, as trees and stones and men are. The specificity of the theoretical ideality might be indicated by a comparison with two other sorts of idealities recognized in phenomenology: *eide* and words. A theory is not an *eidos*, not a material or formal universal, although such a thing can be a matter; for the situation of the universal and the individual example is not the situation of the theory theorized and the matter it is about. Verbal idealities, which can also be called “words,” although Dorion Cairns has called them “verbal expressions,”² are also not theoretical idealities, for one word can express different concepts and the same concept can be expressed by different words (synonyms and homonyms); moreover, the situation of the matter and the theory is not the situation of the verbal thing or word and the physical embodiment or carrier of it, i.e., the perceptible sounds or marks underlying communication. In sum, while the situation of the matter vis-à-vis the theory is *sui generis* and hence not definable, the mentioned comparisons may aid the reader to grasp it.

When one adopts the theoretical attitude, one finds that one has always already “held” theories. One has learned them naively in both everyday life and in specialized training of one sort or another. It may well be characteristic of the human being to be productive of theory. But as a rule this is not done consciously. In other words, upon the adoption of the theoretical attitude in a special or in a general form, the things which were believed, valued, and used, and even perceived, in practical life become what one supposes, become *alleged things*, which, as supposed or alleged, are theories. It is a philosophical commonplace—and hence a serious problem—that “cultural” or “spiritual” sense is actionally and above all habitually conferred or bestowed upon what is automatically pre given. My contention is that cultural sense and theory are the same thing approached in different ways. In the attitude of practical life, no differentiation occurs between

² *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, I (1940), 453-62.

what one believes that things are and what they would be certified to be in a perfect evidence of the appropriate sort. In theoretical life, however, just such a difference is essential. Once theory and matter are dissociated, the question of the ultimate correctness of the theory, which is then of central concern, can arise; and, guided by evidence, it can be answered.

Even where the matters theorized about are real and hence temporally and spatially changeable things, the theoretician does not pursue real changes in them. His exclusive preoccupation is with the theoretical idealities and what is relevant to them. But we must now look more closely at what is intuited, believed, valued, and willed or used in theoretical life. When one is busied with some theory, typically with a proposition, a bit of reflection reveals how it pointingly refers to some matter or matters or other as that or those which it is about. In the theoretical thematizing, the theory once produced is intuited. On the basis of the pointing references, one can also make the matters theorized about evident in the manner of intuition appropriate to the sort of thing they are: if eidetic, eidetic intuiting, if verbal, verbal intuiting, if real, perceptual intuiting, if conceptual, conceptual intuiting, etc. If the theory theorized about the matters and the matters theorized about in the theory “match,” part for part, the theory is true. In such a case, it is at least very difficult and perhaps impossible to maintain a difference between theory and matter, and hence it is best to speak of their “coincidence.” When the theory wholly or partly fails to coincide with the matter it is about, when a synthesis of verification does not occur, the theory involved is wholly or partly false. When a theory has been seen to be false, it becomes a theoretical problem, and it undergoes reconstruction, reorganization, reconception, etc., until it can be seen to be true. But in *theoria* as in practical life, one unfortunately often accepts insufficient evidence. Much of what constitutes a scientific discipline are rules of evidence appropriate in the domain of the science.

The theory thematized in the theoretical attitude is believed in various modes, running through doubtful, improbable, implausible, plausible, probable, and certain; but in *theoria*, depending on the evidentness of the matter in the theory, these modes are themselves modified as either simply supposed or alleged or as critically confirmed. Once a theory or theory part (a proposition or an argument) has been examined “in the light of the matters themselves,” it is retained as critically certain, and that particular need to make the matter appear in it is satisfied. Yet another can arise. One is always in principle able to repeat the verification of a theory.³

While there has always been emphasis on the doxic positionality involved in *theoria*, the pathic and praxic dimensions have been underemphasized. Where the former is concerned, we should not forget the *philos* in *philosophia*. Any scientist or scholar is aware of the passionate involvement which his discipline requires. To be sure, the affective-emotional aspect of theoretical life is far “cooler” than that of practical life. But it is not absent. One values theories in several respects, above all for their distinctness, clarity, and truth. One evaluatively prefers the more distinct, the clearer, the more true theory, as seen in the best available light of the matters it is about, to the theory that is more confused, obscure, and false. To the degree that the matters it is about do not appear in the theory as the theory pointingly indicates that they should, the theory is disliked or negatively valued—we can call it “*bad* theory.” When the theory has coincided with the relevant matters—about-which it has been theorized and hence one’s doxic acceptance of it is warranted, it is a “*good* theory” and it is valued positively.

Can one seriously speak of *using* theories? There is an indirect sense in

³ For a very similar approach and more extensive statement of findings in this vein cf. Richard M. Zaner, “The Phenomenology of Epistemic Claims: And its Bearing on the Essence of Philosophy,” in *Phenomenology and Social Reality: Essays in Memory of Alfred Schutz*, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970).

which I believe one can. A theory which better coincides with the matters is to be preferred to the one which one finds one has heretofore held; and still that better theory might itself not yet be theorized. Using the future conceiving, the judging, the verifying, etc., in which the better theory would be produced as an end, one may tentatively entertain various theories or parts of theories as means. The processes of living in which the desired theory is going to be constituted are in the future, even if the thing they are blindly anticipated as intente to is atemporal. The various “entertainings” of alternative theories as means to the producing of the theory desired are also life-processes. Thus, while theories themselves cannot be used as ends and means, processes of theorizing in which they are constituted can be. In this way, then, there can be a will to know theoretically.

Perhaps the first-noticed feature of theoretical life, when it goes on, is that, in it, one is socially uninvolved or solitary. Where the theoretical theme is concerned, having a theory and expressing it are different things and not necessarily connected. Until it is “published,” a theory is a private thing. Once published in words, however, a theory is a public object and subject to consideration on the part of others. The theorizer himself is detached, he stands back, etc. He may consider a theory propounded by an other, but he actually theorizes alone, without the give-and-take of practical working together. This does not mean that the data of social interaction, including communication, are not available to him, even though he does not take part in such interaction actively. One can read and listen as well as observe while in the theoretical attitude. What it does mean, however, is that, qua theorizer, one does not seek to participate in any working that may occur on the part of an other or others. Preoccupied with theorizing good theory, one does not express oneself or act with a view to affecting others at all, or, more generally, one does not engage in producing, preserving, preventing, or destroying any *real* things. One watches, one does not work. What a

theorizer wants is a good theory. In order to get it, he refrains from trying to improve reality.

Where somatic movement is concerned, it is not used as a means to the end of real change in a thing of one's environment when one is theorizing. In principle, one can theorize without moving. One cannot work without moving. Nevertheless, moving often does occur in the theoretical attitude, but only as a means to the observation of matters theorized about or as a means to the organization of concepts into theories. An ethnologist, for example, when present at a ritual he wishes to understand, does not aim at participating in it or exercising any influence on it.

Rather, when he does move about the scene of the ritual, it is in order to watch it better. To be able to recall what he has seen, he may take notes. Somatic movement is used in both cases as means, just as in practical life; but the end it is used for is theoretical and not practical, and in that lies all the difference.

I might note in conclusion that, when one returns to the practical attitude, the theory-matter difference ceases to occur. Theories are no longer thematized. However, what was found out theoretically is retained in such a way that the nature of the things upon which one works can be said to be different. What one believes them to be afterwards is different from what one had believed them to be beforehand, before one's excursion into theoria. Thus one's practical working is affected.